A method to elicit beliefs as most likely intervals
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2015, Vol 10, Issue 5
Abstract
We show how to elicit the beliefs of an expert in the form of a “most likely interval”, a set of future outcomes that are deemed more likely than any other outcome. Our method, called the Most Likely Interval elicitation rule (MLI), asks the expert for an interval and pays according to how well the answer compares to the actual outcome. We show that the MLI performs well in economic experiments, and satisfies a number of desirable theoretical properties such as robustness to the risk preferences of the expert.
Authors and Affiliations
Karl H. Schlag and Joël J. van der Weele
Learning to reason: The influence of instruction, prompts and scaffolding, metacognitive knowledge, and general intelligence on informal reasoning about everyday social and political issues
Twelve experiments examined ways of improving informal reasoning, as assesed by presenting students with accessible, current, and interesting social and political issues, eliciting reasoning about them, and scoring the r...
The opportunity-threat theory of decision-making under risk
A new theory of decision-making under risk, the Opportunity-Threat Theory is proposed. Analysis of risk into opportunity and threat components allows description of behavior as a combination of opportunity seeking and th...
The effect of incomplete information on the compromise effect
Most research on the compromise effect focuses on how consumers make their decisions in a complete information scenario; however, consumers generally lack sufficient information when they make purchase decisions. This re...
Additivity dominance: Additivites are more potent and more often lexicalized across languages than are “subtractives”
Judgments of naturalness of foods tend to be more influenced by the process history of a food, rather than its actual constituents. Two types of processing of a “natural” food are to add something or to remove something....
Outcomes and expectations in dilemmas of trust
Rational trust decisions depend on potential outcomes and expectations of reciprocity. In the trust game, outcomes and expectations correspond to the structural factors of risk and temptation. Two experiments investigate...