Anti-social motives explain increased risk aversion for others in decisions from experience
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2019, Vol 14, Issue 1
Abstract
When deciding for others based on explicitly described odds and outcomes, people often have different risk preferences for others than for themselves. In two pre-registered experiments, we examine risk preference for others where people learn about the odds and outcomes by experiencing them through sampling. In both experiments, on average, people were more risk averse for others than for themselves, but only when the risky option had a higher expected value. Furthermore, based on a separate set of choices, we classified people as pro- or anti-social. Only those people classified as anti-social were more risk averse for others, whereas those classified as prosocial chose similarly for themselves and others. When the uncertainty was removed, however, all participants exhibited less anti-social behavior. Together, these results suggest that anti-social motives contribute to the observed limited risk taking for others and that outcome uncertainty facilitates the expression of these motives.
Authors and Affiliations
Sebastian Olschewski, Marius Dietsch and Elliot A. Ludvig
Keywords
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