Berkeley on the Relation Between Abstract Ideas and Language in Alciphron VII

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Berkeley on the Relation Between Abstract Ideas and Language in Alciphron VII

Journal Title: Ruch Filozoficzny - Year 2018, Vol 74, Issue 4

Abstract

The argument against the existence of abstract ideas in the Introduction to the Principles is one of Berkeley’s most famous arguments. His view that all our ideas are particular and that the Lockean process of abstraction is impossible pervades his philosophy well beyond the Introduction and even the Principles itself. The role Berkeley’s anti-abstractionism plays in his wider philosophy has been discussed by several commentators in relation to his arguments for immaterialism. However, a great deal less has been said about its role in Berkeley’s philosophy of language. Dialogue VII of Alciphron is Berkeley’s most extended discussion of language and where he develops his alternative to the Lockean theory of meaning. In this paper, by focusing on this dialogue, I examine the crucial connection that Berkeley identifies between how we use language and the supposed existence of abstract ideas. I argue that, as it turns out, we should not see Berkeley’s anti-abstractionism as playing a role in his argument against Lockean semantics of language. Instead, Berkeley’s view is that by providing an alternative to Locke’s theory he removes the need for abstract ideas as explanatory posits. Only once the Lockean theory is accepted, Berkeley thinks, are abstract ideas posited. I argue this reading of the relationship between language and abstract ideas explains why, between early editions of Alciphron and the final edition, Berkeley alters the position of the dialogue’s antagonist, Alciphron, from someone who straightforwardly adopts Lockean abstractionism to someone who does not.

Authors and Affiliations

Peter West

Keywords

Berkeley language ideas abstraction meaning Locke

EP ID EP493516
DOI 10.12775/RF.2018.036
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