Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2015, Vol 10, Issue 2
Abstract
Krupka and Weber (2013) introduce an incentive-compatible coordination game as an alternative method for elicitation of normative judgments. I show, however, that people provide virtually the same responses in incentivized and non-incentivized versions of the Krupka-Weber game. Besides ratings of social appropriateness, I also elicit ratings of fairness of all possible offers in an ultimatum game. Ratings of social appropriateness and fairness are similar for low offers (below or equal to the equal split), but not for high offers which are judged to be more appropriate than fair.
Authors and Affiliations
Štěpán Veselý
Keywords
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