How should we measure Americans’ perceptions of socio-economic mobility?
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2017, Vol 12, Issue 5
Abstract
Several scholars have suggested that Americans’ (distorted) beliefs about the rate of upward social mobility in the United States may affect political judgment and decision-making outcomes. In this article, we consider the psychometric properties of two different questionnaire items that researchers have used to measure these subjective perceptions. Namely, we report the results of a new set of experiments (N = 2,167 U.S. MTurkers) in which we compared the question wording employed by Chambers, Swan and Heesacker (2015) with the question wording employed by Davidai and Gilovich (2015). Each (independent) research team had prompted similar groups of respondents to estimate the percentage of Americans born into the bottom of the income distribution who improved their socio-economic standing by adulthood, yet the two teams reached ostensibly irreconcilable conclusions: that Americans tend to underestimate (Chambers et al.) and overestimate (Davidai & Gilovich) the true rate of upward social mobility in the U.S. First, we successfully reproduced both contradictory results. Next, we isolated and experimentally manipulated one salient difference between the two questions’ response-option formats: asking participants to divide the population into either (a) “thirds” (tertiles) or (b) “20%” segments (quintiles). Inverting this tertile-quintile factor significantly altered both teams’ findings, suggesting that these measures are inappropriate (too vulnerable to question-wording and item-formulation artifacts) for use in studies of perceptual (in)accuracy. Finally, we piloted a new question for measuring subjective perceptions of social mobility. We conclude with tentative recommendations for researchers who wish to model the causes and consequences of Americans’ mobility-related beliefs.
Authors and Affiliations
Lawton K. Swan, John R. Chambers, Martin Heesacker and Sondre S. Nero
Weighing waiting: The influence of information certainty and delay penalty on waiting for noninstrumental information
People have been shown to delay decision making to wait for missing noninstrumental attribute information — information that would not have altered their decision if known at the outset — with this delay originally attri...
What's bad is easy: Taboo values, affect, and cognition
Some decision situations are so objectionable or repugnant that people refuse to make a choice. This paper seeks to better understand taboo responses, and to distinguish choices that are truly taboo from those that are m...
Leftmost-digit-bias in an enumerated public sector? An experiment on citizens’ judgment of performance information
Numerical performance information is increasingly important to political decision-making in the public sector. Some have suggested that biases in citizens’ processing of numerical information can be exploited by politici...
The robustness of anchoring effects on preferential judgments
Anchoring has been shown to influence numeric judgments in various domains, including preferential judgment tasks. Whereas many studies and a recent Many Labs project have shown robust effects in classic anchoring tasks,...
The retrospective gambler’s fallacy: Unlikely events, constructing the past, and multiple universes
The gambler’s fallacy (Tune, 1964) refers to the belief that a streak is more likely to end than chance would dictate. In three studies, participants exhibited a retrospective gambler’s fallacy (RGF) in which an event th...