Orders of criticality in voting games

Journal Title: Operations Research and Decisions - Year 2016, Vol 26, Issue 2

Abstract

The authors focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, the classical notion of the criticality of players has been extended, in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of acoalition thanks to collusion with other players.

Authors and Affiliations

Marco DALL’AGLIO, Vito FRAGNELLI, Stefano MORETTI

Keywords

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  • EP ID EP323620
  • DOI -
  • Views 35
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How To Cite

Marco DALL’AGLIO, Vito FRAGNELLI, Stefano MORETTI (2016). Orders of criticality in voting games. Operations Research and Decisions, 26(2), 53-67. https://europub.co.uk./articles/-A-323620