Polityka obronna Litwy w latach 2014-2018

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Polityka obronna Litwy w latach 2014-2018

Journal Title: Gdańskie Studia Międzynarodowe - Year 2018, Vol 16, Issue 1

Abstract

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 marks the turning point in Lithuania’s defence policy. Previously, Lithuanian armed forces developed expeditionary capabilities in line with NATO’s out-of-area requirements and had to face substantial manning and equipment shortages as a result of the financial crisis. After 2014 clarion call, Lithuania responded with the most comprehensive measures of all the Eastern Flank states to strengthen its military capabilities. Lithuania’s main strategic concerns encompass both the Russian A2/AD bubble in Kaliningrad as well as the development of Russian offensive capabilities in the Baltic Sea region. The Lithuanian strive for security included a big hike in defence spending and a gradual increase in military personnel, with the reinstatement of conscription, faster modernisation of armed forces, development of military infrastructures, investments in combat readiness and an update of military exercises. This was supplemented by the strengthening of defence co-operation with key partners – both bilaterally and within the NATO framework. Lithuania’s main goal was to convince Allies to establish permanent military presence on its territory in order to strengthen deterrence against Russia. Between the NATO Wales Summit in 2014 and the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Lithuania was focused mainly on a closer military collaboration with the US – a country which then took a leading role in the military reassurance of the Eastern Flank. In Lithuania, the US has traditionally been perceived as the main security provider. The Warsaw Summit constituted a milestone in bolstering the Allied defence posture vis-à-vis Russia, which influenced Lithuania’s defence policy. American rotational company-size units in the Baltic states were subsequently replaced by NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, i.e. the deployment of German-led battalion-size battlegroup in Lithuania. Therefore, between 2016 and 2018 Lithuania tried to augment its strong defence ties with US while deepening military integration with Germany. The most significant sign of a closer military co-operation with Germany was the procurement of 88 Boxer infantry fighting vehicles. Recently, Germany has become the biggest supplier of military equipment to the Lithuanian army. Although Lithuania prefers to develop military co-operation primarily with US and Germany, Poland remains its important orientation point (mainly due to a similar threat perception and Poland’s geographic location). The core dimensions of the Polish-Lithuanian defence collaboration are the strengthening of air defence, including Grom systems deliveries, training of special forces and development of the trilateral brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG) together with Ukraine. In the coming years, the ongoing depopulation will remain the biggest internal challenge for the Lithuanian defence policy. Emigration and an ageing society result not only in a decreasing number of citizens reaching the enlistment age, but may also adversely affect the economic situation and - as a consequence - defence expenditure.<br/><br/>

Authors and Affiliations

Piotr Szymański

Keywords

NATO Litwa Morze Bałtyckie wschodnia flanka Rosja USA Niemcy Polska Państwa Bałtyckie Przesmyk Suwalski polityka obrona Lithuania Baltic Sea eastern flank Russia Germany Poland Baltic states Suwalki Gap defence policy

EP ID EP416484
DOI 10.5604/01.3001.0012.7625
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