Proliferation as a Factor Maintaining Human Evolution in the Light of Paul K. Feyerabend’s Early Philosophy
Journal Title: Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy - Year 2013, Vol 10, Issue 0
Abstract
In his early philosophy, Feyerabend claimed that the interaction between the principles of proliferation and tenacity may increase the tendency towards useful biological mutations. He also maintained that the interplay between the two principles may be the only possible way of preventing the human species from stagnation. I try to rectify some problems of Feyerabend’s approach. The claim that it is possible to increase the tendency towards useful biological mutations by means of generating and defending hypotheses seemingly implies Lamarckism, i.e. the theory of directed variation. However, it could also be incorporated into Darwinism, i.e. the theory of undirected variation (it is suggested by the phrase “may increase”). Both approaches lead to serious difficulties: Lamarckism is rejected by the mainstream biology; Darwinian adaptive changes are very slow. Biologically useful effects of interplay between proliferation and tenacity may come out after a very long time. Feyerabendian conviction that interaction between proliferation and tenacity may be the only possible way of preventing our species from stagnation should be understood in the light of human cultural evolution, and the latter is of course Lamarckian.
Authors and Affiliations
Krzysztof Kilian
Zarys modelu poziomów analizy w badaniach relacji nauki i religii
W artykule proponuję model podziału twierdzeń o rzeczywistości, różnicujący je pod względem stopnia ich empirycznego charakteru. Zaproponowany model ma ułatwiać analizę zagadnień z zakresu relacji nauki i religii. Na naj...
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