Recognition-based judgments and decisions: What we have learned (so far)
Journal Title: Judgment and Decision Making - Year 2011, Vol 6, Issue 5
Abstract
This special issue on recognition processes in inferential decision making represents an adversarial collaboration among the three guest editors. This introductory article to the special issue’s third and final part comes in three sections. In Section 1, we summarize the six papers that appear in this part. In Section 2, we give a wrap-up of the lessons learned. Specifically, we discuss (i) why studying the recognition heuristic has led to so much controversy, making it difficult to settle on mutually accepted empirically grounded assumptions, (ii) whether the development of the recognition heuristic and its theoretical descriptions could explain some of the past controversies and misconceptions, (iii) how additional cue knowledge about unrecognized objects could enter the decision process, (iv) why recognition heuristic theory should be complemented by a probabilistic model of strategy selection, and (v) how recognition information might be related to other information, especially when considering real-world applications. In Section 3, we present an outlook on the thorny but fruitful road to cumulative theory integration. Future research on recognition-based inferences should (i) converge on overcoming past controversies, taking an integrative approach to theory building, and considering theories and findings from neighboring fields (such as marketing science and artificial intelligence), (ii) build detailed computational process models of decision strategies, grounded in cognitive architectures, (iii) test existing models of such strategies competitively, (iv) design computational models of the mechanisms of strategy selection, and (v) effectively extend its scope to decision making in the wild, outside controlled laboratory situations.
Authors and Affiliations
Julian N. Marewski, Rüdiger F. Pohl and Oliver Vitouch
Keywords
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