THE EFFECTS OF RATIONAL IGNORANCE FOR VOTERS, REGULATORS AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

Apply

THE EFFECTS OF RATIONAL IGNORANCE FOR VOTERS, REGULATORS AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

Journal Title: Tarsus University Journal of The Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences - Year 2021, Vol 2, Issue 2

Abstract

It is impossible to know everything for anybody even if he/she is a genius person. Because it is inevitable in all humans to some degree, and each person must individually decide what is worth knowing and understanding. It also helps us decide what information will be most beneficial. In this sense, it means choosing to remain uninformed about something; because the potential benefits estimated may be less than the cost of acquiring knowledge. In elective democratic systems, governments come to power with elections. In order to obtain the power, regulators/candidates try to maximize the number of votes they receive in elections and money and/or special knowledge of special interest groups to cover their campaign expenses to give messages to inform voters about their policies. In case of any conflict between voters and special interest groups’ outcome, regulators can take advantage of rational ignored voters to give some benefits to the special interest group. In this paper, it will be tried to explain the reasons behind voters’ rational ignorance, how voters’ utility change in cases of perfect information and imperfect information and how special interest groups can take advantage from voters’ rational ignorance situation and how candidates or regulators will behave to maximize their expected votes.

Authors and Affiliations

Adil ALKAN

Keywords

EP ID EP706590
DOI -
Views 73
Downloads 0