Finding the Pareto optimal equitable allocation of homogeneous divisible goods among three players
Journal Title: Operations Research and Decisions - Year 2017, Vol 27, Issue 3
Abstract
We consider the allocation of a finite number of homogeneous divisible items among three players. Under the assumption that each player assigns a positive value to every item, we develop a simple algorithm that returns a Pareto optimal and equitable allocation. This is based on the tight relationship between two geometric objects of fair division: The Individual Pieces Set (IPS) and the Radon–Nykodim Set (RNS). The algorithm can be considered as an extension of the Adjusted Winner procedure by Brams and Taylor to the three-player case, without the guarantee of envy-freeness.
Authors and Affiliations
Marco DALL’AGLIO, Camilla DI LUCA, Lucia MILONE
Keywords
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